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Beyond carbon pricing: policy levers for negative emission 
technologies 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores policies for Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs), in an attempt to move beyond the 
supply-side focus of the majority of NETs research, as well as the current dominance of carbon pricing as the 
main NETs policy proposal. The paper identifies a number of existing policies from four key areas - 
energy/transport, agriculture, sub-soil, and oceans - which will have an impact on three NETs: Bioenergy with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), Direct Air Capture (DAC), and terrestrial Enhanced Rock Weathering 
(ERW). We propose that non-climate co- e efits a  e alua le i  te s of the poli  de a d pull  fo  
NETs; in particular, we find that ERW may provide multiple co-benefits which can be mandated through 
existing policy structures. However, interaction with numerous policy areas may also create barriers, 
particularly where there is tension between the priorities of different government departments. On the basis 
of existing and analogous policies from a range of geographical contexts and scales, this paper proposes four 
options for NETs policy that could be reasonably implemented in the near-term. We also argue that ERW 
demonstrates the importance of scale and framing, because the policy environment depends on whether it is 
framed as a soil amendment at local scales or as a climate stabilisation technique at international scale. 
 
 
Key policy insights 
• Co-benefits may assist the de a d pull  fo  o el te h ologies  p o idi g ultiple poli  a gles 
fo  i e ti isatio  athe  tha  el i g o  a fi -all  poli  su h as a high a o  p i e. 
• DAC with storage might be overly reliant on a high carbon price, because it only provides one core 
benefit – that of atmospheric carbon reduction. 
• ERW may provide multiple co-benefits which can be mandated through existing policy structures, but 
should focus on using waste rock rather than mining virgin material. 
• We propose four near-term options for NETs policy: funding for small-scale BECCS demonstration 
and an international biomass certification mechanism; small-scale loans for ERW on farms and 
promotion of locally-sourced rock residues; amendment of fertiliser subsidy schemes to include 
silicate rock; and a clearer framework for licensing sub-soil access for CO2 storage. 
 
Keywords: NETs; carbon dioxide removal; co-benefits; BECCS; enhanced rock weathering; direct air 
capture 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
It has been increasingly suggested that in order to meet ambitious global climate change targets, there will 
be a need to remove previously-emitted carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere using negative emissions 
technologies (NETs) (EASAC, 2018; IPCC, 2018). Because of this, policy and academic interest in NETs has 
grown significantly over the past few years, with the academic literature focusing on an increasingly diverse 
range of NETs (Minx et al., 2018). As pointed out by Nemet et al. (2018), the vast majority of existing NETs 
research focuses on the supply-side (for instance, R&D and technology potentials), whilst very little focuses 
 
on demand-side issues such as public acceptability and policy. These demand-side policy issues, however, will 
be critical to successful NETs deployment. Bellamy and Healey (2018) demonstrate that the current 
go e a e halle ges fo  NETs a  e ha a te ised as o e of a  uphill st uggle  tha  a slippe  slope , 
therefore there is a need to begin examining options for responsible incentivisation. Long lead times for 
innovation also mean that it may be sensible to pay attention to policy levers sooner rather than later, 
because often the most challenging part of the innovation process is the move from development to large-
scale deployment. This paper uses analogues from existing policies to explore potential policy routes for 
some major NETs and the various scales and actor dynamics which they may entail. 
 
One of the main proposed routes for NETs incentivisation is through large-scale emissions reductions 
markets, such as emissions trading schemes (ETS). Existing schemes do not currently incentivise negative 
emissions: to do so would require issuance of credits for negative emissions, rather than just emissions 
reductions (Berg et al., 2017). These amendments to ETS have been hypothesised but are not currently 
apparent in any trading scheme. In the EU, ETS reforms alone are unlikely to be enough to finance large-scale 
deployment of BECCS (Berg, 2016), although they might go some way to reduce uncertainty and risk for 
investors. Honegger and Reiner (2018) argue that the new Sustainable Development Mechanism (Article 6.4 
of the Paris Agreement) could incentivise NETs by harnessing financial transfers to mobilize the NET potential 
in countries that are unable to afford the capital costs. This would require Article 6.4 to incorporate agreed 
methodologies to quantify the sequestered CO2 and the permanence of its storage, and would require the 
NETs to deliver verifiable co-benefits for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The viability of 
incentivising NETs under any carbon trading policy relies on the accuracy of monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) of carbon sequestration and life-cycle emissions.  
 
Existing policy research mainly focuses on the few NET policies that already exist, generally confined to the 
carbon mechanisms discussed above, and upstream R&D. We argue that interesting insights can be gained 
by looking beyond explicit policies on climate mitigation, because many NETs operate across multiple sectors. 
As an illustration of this, it is worth briefly exploring the assumed major driver of future NETs deployment: 
high global carbon prices. The majority of Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) as used by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assume perfect-foresight discounting over a 100-year 
time horizon; this, combined with a limited carbon budget, leads to exponentially increasing carbon prices 
and a prevalence of NETs (Obersteiner et al., 2018). Carbon prices are indeed emerging in various 
jurisdictions around the world, but are enormously variable and act mainly as reflections of national 
priorities. For example, Sweden, with its abundant biomass resources, prices carbon at $139/tonne, whereas 
Norway (with its vital domestic gas industry) prices some fuels at $64/t but others at zero (World Bank, 
2018). IAMs also do not consider the revenue source for these carbon prices: NETs produce negative 
e issio s, ea i g that the ta  e o es a su sid . The e e ue f om this subsidy would presumably be 
sourced from carbon taxation and thus would decrease as decarbonisation advances, so beyond a certain 
point net carbon removal would be politically highly challenging and potentially unpopular with taxpayers 
(Royal Society and RAEng, 2018). Furthermore, carbon taxes are naturally regressive, a feature that can 
theoretically be counteracted using the principle of revenue neutrality (Metcalf, 2009), but as NETs would 
not produce any revenue, this would no longer be possible. Most importantly, regardless of whether a 
carbon tax would be most economically efficient in an ideal world, history demonstrates that it is implausible 
that any one policy would be the actual outcome. Experience shows that transitions do not follow complex 
modelling studies, but instead tend to result from national or regional political considerations (Geden et al., 
2018a). Thus, whilst we do not dispute that a carbon price would be beneficial for carbon reduction and 
carbon removal innovations, our starting point for this paper is that it would not necessarily provide the 
promised panacea. There is value in exploring whether other policies and mechanisms – including but not 
 
limited to taxes, subsidies, trading schemes, regulations, and voluntary mechanisms – could be relevant for 
incentivising NETs. Furthermore, existing climate policy experience (for example, the introduction of 
Nationally Determined Contributions [NDCs] in the Paris Agreement) suggests that policies are likely to 
emerge piecemeal and will vary between jurisdictions (Beck and Mahony, 2018). The heterogeneity of 
proposed NETs also suggests the need to discuss a suite of policy perspectives that account for the diversity 
of te h i ues a d o te ts, athe  tha  el i g o  a o e-size-fits-all  app oa h.  
 
This paper focuses on three major proposed NETs, described in more detail in Table 1: Bioenergy with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS); terrestrial Enhanced Rock Weathering (ERW); and Direct Air Capture 
with Storage (DACS). These were chosen because, according to the latest meta-analysis of existing research, 
they are the three proposed NETs with the largest long-term sequestration potential (Minx et al., 2018: Fig. 
6). This is not to suggest that these three are the most promising, or should be the priority for policy-makers; 
merely that, in terms of thinking about policy overall, a useful starting point may be to consider the options 
with the biggest potential for CO2 removal. There is also much uncertainty regarding sequestration 
potentials, with a large range and frequent updating of estimates, therefore policy planning should be 
mindful of the need to avoid closing down particular approaches and to enable competitive technology 
learning. It is also worth emphasising that there is still open discussion on the impacts and side-effects of 
most NETs, and thus our attempts to identify relevant policy areas for incentivising NETs should not be read 
as support for these per se. For many novel NETs, more needs to be known about potential environmental 
and social impacts, therefore the R&D-first  stance adopted by most policy-makers (and many academics) is 
in some ways pragmatic. However, this approach clearly has a supply-side bias, assuming as it does that 
techno-economic R&D must take precedence over socio-political R&D. Exploring analogous policy areas and 
outcomes may also help to anticipate side-effects. Co-benefits and co-costs can be socio-political as well as 
biophysical in nature, particularly in the way that interventions are framed and perceived, therefore there 
may be a need for real-world experimentation by practitioners and communicators, as well as for scientific 
research. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
 
This paper is structured around four policy areas with which the three NETs interact considerably: 
energy/transport, agriculture, sub-soil, and oceans. This list is by no means exhaustive: there are others with 
which these NETs interact (such as manufacturing, health and waterways), and further research could 
examine other contexts and sectors. It is also worth noting that they are interlinked and overlapping, 
particularly in the case of climate policy which is often the responsibility of multiple policy departments. For 
each policy area, we looked for examples in the literature of policies that may impact the three NETs 
discussed, and selected or deselected policies based on our goal of representing a diversity of geographical 
contexts, scales and actors, within a limited space. The sources used were all online, comprising policy and 
legislation documents, peer-reviewed literature and grey literature. Searches were carried out using Web of 
Knowledge, google scholar and google.com. Our search terms included terms relating to each policy area 
(e.g. e e g  ele t i it  a d t a spo t ), a d i ludi g the o ds poli /poli ies , egulatio , legislatio  
a d go e /governance . In the following section, we discuss the four policy areas in turn, illustrating 
existing policies from around the world which could impact upon the three NETs. Section 3 then shifts to a 
technology-based approach, focusing on each of the three NETs to identify opportunities and barriers for 
policy-making in the near term; we propose four options for NETs policy which could reasonably be 
 
implemented in the near-term. We conclude by reflecting on the importance of how NETs are framed in 
policy discussions, particularly in terms of scale. 
 
2 Policies relevant to negative emissions technologies 
2.1 Energy and transport 
In energy terms, the bioenergy component of BECCS provides a revenue stream which may be larger than 
those available to other NETs (Platt et al., 2018). This also makes it eligible for support from bioenergy 
policies, which a e esta lished i  a  ju isdi tio s a ou d the o ld. Fo  e a ple, the EU s ‘e e a le 
Energy Directive (RED) sets a target to supply 14% of transport energy from renewables by 2030, and the 
Fuel Quality Directive stipulates a 6% reduction in emissions from transport by 2020 (Berg et al., 2017). 
Currently, the majority of this is met by biomass. Several US States have implemented low-carbon fuel 
standards which provide an incentive for emissions abatement in biofuel production, and California is 
currently developing protocols to enable the use of CCS in fuel standards and potentially in its cap-and-trade 
programme (Sanchez et al., 2018). BECCS is most commonly discussed in relation to electricity (discussed in 
more detail below), but options for carbon capture at plants producing liquid bioenergy for transport are also 
being explored. However, the capture rate for liquid fuel is only 40-50%, as opposed to around 90% in 
electricity (IPCC, 2018), therefore electricity sector policies will be crucial for large-scale CO2removal via 
BECCS. It is worth noting that bioenergy policies in electricity and transport sectors may not be mutually 
reinforcing, because competition for limited biomass resource could drive up prices, while incentivising 
biofuels in transport could also retard the electrification of transport systems.  
 
Electricity from biomass is non-intermittent, meaning that in theory any policy to promote the use of flexible 
renewables instead of fossil fuels in the power sector could benefit bioenergy.1 A large number of 
jurisdictions have implemented capacity mechanisms as part of national energy security strategies (including 
France, Germany, Italy, UK and numerous US States), although the success of bioenergy in an auction-type 
system depends on the structure of the domestic market. However, incentivising bioenergy as flexible or 
peaking capacity would limit the running hours, because it would be used mainly when supply is tight, which 
could make the high capital cost of BECCS even less economically feasible. Furthermore, this would 
significantly reduce the ability of BECCS to remove CO2 from the atmosphere (Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2017), 
thus rendering its use as a NET largely pointless. Thus on the face of it, BECCS can provide system balancing 
capabilities as well as climate benefits, but in reality, such policies would potentially incentivise the use of 
bioenergy but not necessarily combined with CCS. Therefore proposals to incentivise BECCS using 
technology-neutral capacity mechanisms or other system management policies will likely be limited, and 
revenue from ancillary services markets are unlikely to be enough to make BECCS cost-competitive. Overall, 
there are cheaper options for system balancing, and options such as demand-side response and storage are 
experiencing significant cost reductions. BECCS also has system drawbacks in terms of the increased energy 
requirements for carbon capture, thus the energy co-benefits of BECCS are unlikely to provide a viable policy 
route for incentivisation unless aligned with ambitious emissions-reduction policies.  
 
Trade-offs may exist between energy security of supply, and the NETs discussed here. DACS and ERW in 
particular have high energy requirements – DACS for the running of the capture units, and ERW for crushing 
                                                          
1 Note the distinction of flexible renewable capacity: capacity mechanisms generally incentivise any flexible capacity, 
meaning that bioenergy competes against cheaper gas and coal. Renewable incentives are offered separately, and do 
not tend to incentivise flexible capacity. 
 
rocks. This power intensity could create tensions with domestic energy security and demand-reduction 
policies, especially for emerging economies with rapidly-increasing energy demand, and for countries such as 
Japan and Singapore which already struggle to site low-carbon electricity capacity. In many emerging 
economies, the energy requirements could also be hampered by a lack of adequate transmission 
infrastructure. Proponents of DACS argue that it could run intermittently, using power during times of 
oversupply to avoid curtailment or negative power prices. Yet current trends indicate that advances in 
electricity storage and demand-side flexibility could significantly reduce supply peaks in the future. In cases 
where there is tension between energy security and NETs objectives, overall it is likely that domestic energy 
security policies will take precedence, because the short-term political and economic risk from an energy 
shortfall is significantly higher than any risks which might accrue from a lack of domestic NETs capability. 
 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is central to pipeline and storage elements of both BECCS and DACS. CCS 
technology, however, has suffered from a serious lack of policy and financial support worldwide, with 
significant implications for the viability of CCS-based NETs. The Global CCS Institute (2018) currently lists 18 
operational plants, the majority of which use the captured CO2 for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), resulting in 
increased fossil fuel supply and net-positive emissions. The US recently reformed their tax credit system to 
incentivise CCS, with tax credits now available at $35/tonne for EOR and $50/t for geological storage 
(Bushman et al., 2018). However, the deadline for commencing construction is January 2024, thus a limited 
number of DACS projects may be eligible in time, and it has been argued that the main beneficiaries will 
probably be EOR projects (Buck, 2018). Similarly in China and India, CCS is increasingly popular in policy 
discourse and the opportunity for CCS retrofits on coal plants could reduce costs; however, this will not 
necessarily be low-carbon, because EOR is simultaneously expanding (IEA, 2016). CCS also significantly 
reduces power station efficiency, meaning that for many emerging economies, inadequate electricity 
capacity will be a significant barrier to conventional CCS, let alone energy-intensive NETs such as DACS. 
Current policy thus suggests that incentivising air capture via market mechanisms is dependent on a high 
carbon price, or will lead simply to increased carbon production in the form of EOR. This leads Haszeldine et 
al. (2018) to suggest that an important first step could be the issuance of certificates for long-term CO2 
storage for large emitters.  
 
Air capture technology is being developed in conjunction with Carbon Capture and Utilization (CCU), which 
may provide a market for cost reductions; however, this runs a high risk of becoming locked into net positive 
emissions from the re-release of CO2 du i g utilizatio . The te  CCU  i ludes a  di e se te h ologies, 
including EOR, synthetic fuels, horticultural activities, carbonated drinks and wood in construction, each of 
which provides a different storage longevity, therefore climate policy will need to differentiate between 
levels of support for these. There may also be a temptation on the part of developers and even policy-makers 
to frame DAC with usage (DACU) in terms of negative emissions, therefore there is a need for clarity that 
most types of CCU do not remove CO2 from the atmosphere in the long-term. This will require further 
development and use of life-cycle emissions assessment, because emissions produced by usage further 
downstream in the value chain may not currently be fully recognised as part of the DAC process (Assen et al., 
2013).  
 
CCS is usually governed by energy departments because of its alignment with the fossil fuel industry, but its 
main function is emissions reduction, and it in fact creates a rather substantial energy penalty. It thus 
illustrates some of the tensions between departmental remits, because there may be little inherent incentive 
within energy departments to promote CCS: there are cheaper ways of reducing energy system emissions. 
This may be particularly the case for places such as India where responsibility for emissions reduction sits 
mainly with the department for environment rather than energy. Japan is a particularly salient example of 
 
this sort of tension: the Ministry of Environment (currently responsible for CCS demonstration) and the 
Ministry of Economy (responsible for energy) appear to have fundamentally different views on climate policy 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2018). Government departments with responsibility for CCS may need to offer direct 
incentives, for instance in funding allocated via competitions, or in periodic omnibus legislation such as 
mandates introduced via Energy Bills (Sanchez et al., 2018). We are not the first authors to argue this, and 
there is increasing pressure on governments to support CCS as a means to eventual NETs deployment; 
carbon pricing mechanisms and trading schemes have not succeeded, thus direct intervention (most likely at 
national or State/regional scale) is required (Haszeldine et al., 2018). 
 
 
2.2 Agriculture 
The agricultural context will be a crucial one for many types of land-based NETs, including BECCS and ERW. 
The agriculture sector in many jurisdictions is strongly supported by powerful lobbying and is often a priority 
sector for governments. This creates interesting actor dynamics: on the one hand, agriculture tends to be 
well-supported in terms of revenue, especially in large food-exporting nations; on the other hand, 
implementing measures such as environmental regulations can be near-impossible. Environmental measures 
can be very unpopular with farming lobbies, for instance if they require substantial changes to embedded 
practices, and therefore they often take the form of incentives rather than regulations.  
 
ERW may improve soil fertility (Beerling et al., 2018), meaning that it may be politically attractive in food-
exporting economies if proposed benefits emerge. Agricultural subsidies including direct payments are 
present in most food-producing economies, and these could provide a revenue stream to ERW, particularly 
where farmers are offered low-cost loans for new inputs or machinery.2 For example, in Brazil, generous 
agricultural credit is available for new techniques; in Canada, the Growing Forward Initiative provides funding 
for developing new technologies; in Turkey, subsidies are provided to improve farm production capacity 
(Allen, 2016). Loans for the rock material would encourage farmers to shift from current soil amendment 
practices, such as liming, to ERW, and loans for spreading machinery could assist smaller farmers to start 
using rock amendments. However, these types of targeted interventions would have to compete with other 
farming priorities; for example, it is common for agricultural policy to focus on supporting particular crops for 
strategic reasons such as export markets. Nevertheless, small-scale subsidies (for instance at local level) 
could support the use of ERW on small numbers of farms, thus increasing visibility and familiarity amongst 
the farming community; if these amendments were successful at improving yields and soil quality without 
damaging ecosystems, loan schemes could be introduced more widely. 
 
Depending on the rock product used, ERW may provide benefits such as reduced soil pH and improved 
nutrient uptake in plants, meaning that it may be a partial replacement for some conventional fertilisers 
(Beerling et al., 2018). This may be particularly relevant for nutrient-poor tropical soils, for instance in South-
East Asia where many governments offer fertiliser subsidies. In Thailand, the health ministry has called for an 
outright ban on certain agricultural chemicals (Bangprapa, 2018), which if enacted could benefit non-
chemical fertilisers such as crushed rock. Meanwhile, Malaysia already imports large quantities of phosphate 
rock to use as fertiliser; however, the government is also promoting a shift away from mineral fertilisers. In 
India, urea is heavily subsidised and there is a lack of regulation of run-off (Abrol et al., 2017). These 
examples illustrate the fact that fertiliser policies are highly heterogeneous, meaning that ERW development 
needs to pay attention to the particular fertiliser policies in any area. In most countries, silicate rock is not 
                                                          
2 One exception to this is New Zealand, which eliminated agricultural subsidies in the mid-1980s. 
 
currently included as an eligible fertiliser because of its relatively novel status, thus schemes would need to 
be amended to include it. Berg et al. (2017) argue that organic standards could represent a barrier to ERW 
because they only permit certain types of soil amendments; however, the literature review conducted for 
this paper did not uncover examples of any organic standards that would prohibit basalt applications.3 
Finally, tests are underway to establish whether ERW may enable crops to use nitrogen more efficiently, 
reducing the need for nitrogen fertiliser. Pressure is building on governments to enact stronger 
environmental nitrogen-reduction policies, which could benefit ERW; yet implementing strict regulations is 
challenging in the face of powerful agricultural lobbying, and will depend on the power dynamics between 
the state and the private sector, and in most cases, between the agriculture and environment ministries. The 
applicability of nitrogen policies to ERW would also require crushed rock to be used instead of nitrogen-
based fertilisers, with the degree of substitution depending on the attitudes and actions of farmers, the cost 
of the various options (including subsidies), and the extent of lock-in to nitrogen-based fertiliser practices.  
 
Whilst BECCS could be incentivised using biomass policies from the agriculture sector, such policies have had 
their share of unintended consequences, which may provide useful lessons for future policy-making (cf. Buck, 
2016). The land-use changes associated with biofuel planting can result in greater carbon emissions than 
they absorb, and there is considerable evidence that biofuels can cause severe ecological and social impacts 
in the areas from which they are sourced. They may also result in trade-offs with the SDGs (Honegger et al., 
2018). These issues impacted the EU Renewable Energy Directive, which initially mandated increased use of 
crop-based biofuels, but after considerable debate, such use was eventually capped at no more than 7% of 
all transport fuels until 2030 (Geden et al., 2018b). These lessons are also important for ERW, which could 
operate alongside biomass production, opening up incentives and cost reductions under agricultural policies 
but also leaving ERW vulnerable to the substantial drawbacks of some of these policies. A potential challenge 
to BECCS may come from increasing concern over the sustainability of bioenergy, which could put pressure 
on its i lusio  i  s he es fo  e e a le  e e gies and in agricultural support mechanisms, particularly in 
the EU. 
 
 
2.3 The sub-soil 
The three NETs discussed in this paper all interact strongly with issues relating to the subsoil. DACS and 
BECCS both rely on the same storage processes into deep geological formations, requiring the piping of 
pressurised CO2 deep underground. The status of policy on geological storage differs considerably from place 
to place. The EU has already established a fairly comprehensive CCS Directive (EurLex, 2009), which enforces 
rules regarding safety, security, permits and liability; developing this Directive was problematic because of 
significant public opposition to CO2 storage in Germany and the Netherlands, resulting in strict regulation of 
storage sites. In the US, EOR is already well-established, meaning that much of the regulatory apparatus 
already exists; however, there will be a need for near-term support to incentivise storage, most likely at 
State-level due to the fede al go e e t s u e t oppositio  to li ate change regulation. Meanwhile in 
Asia, CCS policies are largely absent; Wu et al. (2014) argue that the EU Directive provides a model for the 
development of a CCS framework in China, alongside a mandatory ETS to incentivise CCS deployment.  
 
Subsoil ownership is also an important factor to consider for CO2 storage. In many areas, ownership has yet 
to be determined, resulting in uncertainty over permits for CCS operations. In Alberta (Canada), the 
                                                          
3 We reviewed organic standards for the following jurisdictions: EU, UK, US, China, India, Japan, Thailand, Australia and 
Israel. Because of import/export rules, national organic standards have a high degree of similarity. 
 
provincial government resolved this by declaring State ownership, whereas in the US, the subsoil is owned by 
the landowner above, meaning that compensation is necessary (UCL, 2019). It should be noted that the US 
ownership structure actually benefitted sub-soil fracking operations, because the compensation gave 
landowners a financial incentive; in the UK, where the subsoil is owned by the Crown, attempts to gain public 
support via compensation have been largely unsuccessful (Whitton et al., 2017). An immediate task for 
policy-making on NETs should be to establish an understanding of the politics of the subsoil, including how 
different ownership structures could impact project siting and how public opposition could delay or prevent 
projects, according to the relative role of civil society in different jurisdictional and societal contexts. 
 
ERW requires rock resource for spreading, and in order for it to provide a significant emissions-reduction 
benefit, at least some of this would need to be mined (Strefler et al., 2018). Mining regulations could create 
serious constraints: in most countries, mining is governed by many levels of local, national and regional law, 
and opening new mines and complying with all relevant environmental legislation tends to be a complex and 
expensive process. Environmental regulations may be less stringent in many developing countries, but this 
trades off against damage to ecosystems, environments and communities. Mineral mines are responsible for 
hundreds of ongoing conflicts, particularly in India, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Nigeria and the 
Philippines (EJOLT, 2018). There is also a risk that mining and dust spreading activities could cause health 
problems for workers, especially in countries with less developed regulatory infrastructure, and as such could 
trade off against other policy goals such as the SDGs (Honegger et al., 2018). Better regulation and 
governance of mining activities is crucial for local communities, and should be a priority for ERW projects to 
be carried out in a socially sustainable manner. Overall, the most pragmatic route for ERW in the near-term – 
in legal, economic and ethical terms – may be to avoid mining virgin material altogether and use waste 
materials such as volcanic ash, glacial till or leftovers from the core activities of an existing mine. This, 
however, means that the sequestration potential of ERW may be more limited than has been previously 
suggested. 
 
 
2.4 Oceans 
ERW in particular could interact with policies governing watercourses and the ocean.  However, as the 
weathered material is technically a run-off rather than an addition, it would not fall under the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS, 1982) or the London Convention (1972) which prohibit ocean-based NETs. ERW would add 
alkalinity to oceans; at present, the ecosystem impacts of this are poorly understood, although in theory it 
could benefit coral reef and coastal areas by reducing ocean acidification (Renforth and Henderson, 2017). 
Ocean acidification could in theory fall under the remit of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) process for reducing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, although it has never been 
officially discussed in negotiations, and only appears specifically in the NDCs of 14 small island states (Spence 
et al., 2018). Legislative action on ocean acidification has been taken in the US by Maine and Washington 
State because of impacts to coastal fisheries (Cooley et al., 2016). There is also interest in coral reef 
protection from numerous national and global institutions, including the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP) International Coral Reef Initiative; if ERW succeeds in protecting reefs from ocean acidification, it 
could be eligible for funding under programmes such as these. However, governance from international 
bodies such as UNEP is at a very early exploratory phase, and considering the controversies involved, 
governance at UNEP level is likely to be cautious and incremental.  This is illustrated by the blockage and 
subsequent withdrawal in March 2019 of a Swiss-proposed resolution for UNEP to undertake an assessment 
of geoengineering methods and governance frameworks. A range of marine NETs approaches propose to add 
 
alkalinity directly to the oceans, via a range of mechanisms including ocean-based ERW and ocean liming; 
however, these are beyond the scope of this paper (see GESAMP, 2019, for a review).  
 
DACS and BECCS also interact with ocean policies, although here the policies may create barriers rather than 
incentives. CCS offshore will require building pipes and platforms to access deep geological storage, which 
would need to be regulated to avoid negatively impacting ocean ecosystems. For offshore storage, the 
regulatory environment will depend on whether storage takes place in territorial waters or the high seas. 
Some jurisdictions have already implemented policies governing storage in territorial waters, but these are 
limited to a handful of industrialised economies (e.g. Australia, Scotland), not including any in Asia (UCL, 
2019). Meanwhile storage in the high seas would be governed by UNCLOS, which does not prohibit CCS but 
which does co st ai  a ti ities o side ed to e polluti g . Finally, it is important to remember that policies 
– particularly in democratic countries – are influenced by public attitudes. Research demonstrates that 
people consider oceans to be a particularly precious environment in terms of emotional connection and 
pe ei ed atu al ess  (Spence et al., 2018), and that offshore CO2 storage could be an issue for public 
contestation (Mabon et al., 2014). Thus, it should not be assumed that utilising offshore sites will circumvent 
public concerns regarding CCS, and policy (particularly in terms of licensing and regulation) needs to be 
mindful of potential barriers to deployment at local and possibly national levels. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
 
3 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Current research on NETs is dominated by the supply side, as opposed to demand-side topics such as policy, 
and policy discussions tend to focus on the need for a high (global) carbon price. This paper has attempted to 
move beyond this, by exploring existing policy levers, mechanisms and concepts from multiple policy areas 
and at multiple scales which could be relevant to NETs. We suggest that co-benefits may be valuable in terms 
of the de a d pull  fo  o el te h ologies, fo  i sta e e ause the  p o ide ultiple poli  a gles fo  
i e ti isatio  athe  tha  el i g o  a fi -all  poli  su h as a high a o  p i e hi h has thus fa  p o e  
rather elusive. The preceding section took a sector-based approach, examining existing policies from diverse 
spatial contexts. Table 2 summarises the examples we identified. This section now shifts to a technology-
based approach, focusing on each of the three NETs to identify opportunities and barriers for policy-making 
in the near term. 
 
A major conclusion which may be drawn from the preceding sections is that DACS might be overly reliant on 
climate policies such as a high carbon price, because it only provides one core benefit – that of atmospheric 
carbon reduction. At the moment, air capture technology is being developed in conjunction with CO2 
utilization for oil extraction, synthetic fuels and horticultural activities; this may provide valuable learning 
effects and potentially cost reductions, but without a high carbon price or targeted policies there may be 
little incentive to shift from CO2 utilization (which may not lead to long-term CO2removal) to CO2 storage. 
There is a considerable body of existing research which points out that targeted state-led support may be 
necessary to incentivise CCS; this could take many forms, but the overriding lesson from previous experience 
is that te h olog - eut al  a ket e ha is s do not seem to be working. We also argue that support 
needs to be more transparent about the difference between utilization and long-term storage, particularly in 
cases where CCU technologies with diverse sequestration longevities are discussed under a blanket term. 
 
 
BECCS has a biomass component which produces energy, and which is already well-established in existing 
policy frameworks. However, the previous section demonstrated that despite this co-benefit, the policy 
options for incentivising BECCS from within the energy sector may be somewhat limited. Another important 
factor to consider is that biomass is increasingly globally traded, thus a policy priority should be for adequate 
rules governing the sustainability of imports of biomass feedstocks; a possible first step could be a 
certification scheme similar to the Forestry Stewardship Council, with an international membership of 
individuals and organisations. At present, the externalities of feedstock production are increasingly shifted to 
the Global South, with environmental and climate impacts often going unreported. Thus Thornley and Mohr 
(2018) suggest that BECCS requires overlapping policy mechanisms at different scales, to focus attention on 
local actors and supply chain nodes and impacts that are often below the scope of national/international 
frameworks. Bellamy and Healey (2018) argue that responsible BECCS incentivisation should consider 
otto -up  approaches that pay attention to local and national differences as well as collective ambitions. 
There may be potential for supporting BECCS using local waste feedstock such as residues or municipal 
waste, thus reducing ecological consequences and supporting the domestic waste sector. There is already 
interest in this at demonstration scale, for instance at Klemetstrud in Oslo (Norway), supported by state 
subsidies (Pour et al., 2018). This could involve sub-national actors such as local councils or county 
governments and waste management organisations (public and private, depending on the jurisdiction), as 
well as academics and private-sector institutions interested in supporting R&D.  
 
Proponents of ERW promise numerous co-benefits, and the scientific challenge will be to identify which of 
these are the most robust, requiring positive results from years of field trial research. If the anticipated co-
benefits do emerge, policies relating to agriculture and oceans in particular could provide a revenue stream 
for ERW. For instance, funds for ocean protection could also be viable if increased alkalinity were shown to 
be beneficial for ecosystems such as coral reefs; the actors involved could be international (e.g. UNEP), 
national (e.g. fisheries departments), or sub-national (e.g. Maine, Washington State). Agricultural subsidy 
schemes could realistically support ERW deployment on farms; however, agricultural policies can be 
notoriously political, tough to amend, and highly diverse in reflection of specific national priorities. In 
particular, fertiliser policies are complex and varied, with some countries promoting the use of mineral 
fertilisers as an alternative to chemicals, and others promoting the use of organic waste products such as 
farm residues and manure. In general, reform to national fertiliser schemes could promote the use of silicate 
rock amendments if the benefits were clearly evident. Importantly, many of the relevant policy actors for 
ERW may be small-scale and sub-national; for example, agricultural departments and regional/local farm 
support schemes. This raises questions about the extent to which ERW could ever make a significant 
contribution to CO2 removal – its use as a soil amendment can take place on a small scale, governed by sub-
national policies and actors, but its use as a significant NET would likely require deployment on a much larger 
scale requiring national or even international mandates and raising major MRV challenges.  
 
3.1 Options for NETs policy 
Any discussion of co-benefits comes with the significant caveat that some proposed co-benefits might not 
emerge as promised; the case of the environmental impact of biofuels provides an important cautionary tale 
in this regard. Nevertheless, co-benefits can be socio-political as well as biophysical, and sometimes 
technological learning requires real-world implementation, otherwise promising technologies may struggle 
to transition from basic R&D to deployment, and implementation at smaller scales can sometimes improve 
knowledge regarding the extent of co-benefits and co-costs. With this caveat in mind, we propose the 
following options for NETs policy in the near term:  
 
• Increased funding for BECCS demonstration projects at local scales using locally-produced wastes 
and residues, and an international certification mechanism for biomass feedstocks to support 
sustainable imports.  
• The introduction of small-scale loans for purchase of ERW rock material or machinery for use on 
farms, implemented at local scale in areas where there is a nearby supply of waste rock material, and 
the promotion of locally-sourced volcanic, glacial or mining residues for ERW as alternatives to large-
scale mining and grinding.  
• Amendment of fertiliser subsidy schemes to include silicate rock as a viable soil amendment. 
• A clearer framework for licensing sub-soil access for CO2 storage, giving increased clarity over 
ownership rules and the rights of local citizens.   
 
As a closing remark, it is worth emphasising the critical importance of framing in policy discourse, particularly 
when discussing NETs at different scales. Starting with the influential Royal Society report in 2009, NETs such 
as BECCS, DACS and ERW have followed a particular route in policy discourse which has viewed them as part 
of a suite of geoengineering  techniques. This positioned NETs in the same category as highly controversial 
technologies such as Solar Radiation Management, with impacts on the discourse surrounding their 
implications and risks (Cox et al., 2018). Yet methods such as afforestation and soil carbon sequestration 
were never really tied into the political and ethical debates around geoengineering in the same way, because 
they tend to fall u de  the la guage of a o  si ks . As pointed out by Geden et al. (2018b), definitional 
questions are crucial for the framing of NETs in climate policy, because NETs will likely attract much less 
criticism if they are seen as additional mitigation measures rather than as a distinct third category. ERW is a 
particularly salient example of this crucial framing question, because as we have shown, the policy 
environment looks rather different if it is considered as a soil amendment at local scales, rather than as a 
climate stabilisation technique at international scale. In light of this, we feel it is worth some critical 
reflection on our decision to focus on the three NETs with the greatest estimated sequestration potential, 
because this may not always be the most useful way to think about policy mechanisms for NETs. Any framing 
will open up certain avenues and close down others; further research could explore whether discussing NETs 
at the scales required for stabilising the climate may act to close down alternative routes to incentivisation at 
smaller scales. 
 
This is an exploratory paper in which we have taken a necessary first step in defining the policy environment 
for NETs, focusing on existing policy regimes rather than hypothetical future ones. Context is clearly 
important, and what works for one area may be counterproductive for another; in our research, some 
contexts received more attention than others, particularly the EU, US, China and India, stemming from their 
status as the o ld s la gest o  fastest-growing emitters. Nevertheless, we do not mean to rule out the 
prospect that NET development could happen in other areas, and some methods might be particularly suited 
for locations not covered in this paper, for instance ERW in Brazil or DACS in the Persian Gulf.4 This paper also 
raises the question of the potential magnitude of the effects of co-benefits, because some might result in 
significant effects on carbon reduction or other measures of progress, whilst others might be small or 
incidental. There is therefore scope for further research to explore whether this magnitude can be 
reasonably quantified or ranked, a task for which we would propose using multi-criteria analysis to avoid the 
drawbacks of attempting to monetise and aggregate complex social and environmental benefits and risks 
                                                          
4 Brazil could be suitable for ERW, because it has highly-weathered soils, a hot and humid climate, and large tracts of 
agricultural land (Strefler et al., 2018). Places such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE may be suitable for DACS, because they 
have abundant renewable resource potential, geological storage capacity and capital availability (Chen and Tavoni, 
2013). 
 
(see UNEP, 2011). Fundamentally, the development of effective NETs policy will require dedicated and 
ongoing research to identify projects, proposals and policies which might achieve genuine co-benefits. A 
critical area for further research could be how to balance carbon goals with goals from other sectors, 
including being mindful of the need to prioritise across different timescales. 
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